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 ― Covid has changed the discussion about care, moving it on from the crude 
efficiency and cost priories of the 1980s and 1990s. This is a step forward 
but is insufficient; the approach is still largely managerial and bears little if 
any relationship with the widespread international body of academic work 
on care and how to make it successful.
 ― The current Scottish Government consultation contains no discussion of 
what care is, what it’s for or how it would look and feel for those being 
cared for. 
 ― Rights are entirely the wrong framework for care. Rights is a theory of 
justice rather than of care. Even if rights were an appropriate framework 
within which to deliver care, such an approach can only happen if 
mediated through caring relationships. 
 ― And rights mean nothing if there is no ability to access them – either 
because of poorly-resourced services or because the individual is 
incapable of either fully understanding or taking action to ensure their 
rights are met (as is often the case in a care relationship, for example with 
children, adults with learning difficulties or those with dementia).
 ― Instead, care should be based on building and sustaining relationships 
with those who are cared for. This involves moral and emotional 
investment from workers. The culture of separating rational/intellectual 
factors from intuitive/ emotional ones in care in a false pursuit of 
‘professionalism’ has harmed relational approaches to care and instead 
promoted instrumental ones. 
 ― Care theory moved on from managerial assumptions a long time ago but 
Scottish public policy has not. Only sustained, caring relationships are 
capable of accurately assessing and meeting this change. You cannot 
separate emotional and intuitive approaches to care any more than you 
could remove rational and skillsbased approaches. 
 ― Care is not ‘an intervention’, it is a continuous series of relationships we all 
have in many different settings, most of them informal. You can’t deliver 
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formal care without recognising and working with the reality of informal 
care, whether familial or community-based. 
 ― Care is also political. It is impossible to separate the care we experience 
formally or informally from the context of the services and policies in 
which these take place. This is recognised in the Nordic care model where 
the concept of care is explicitly ‘an art and an act’ structured around good 
public services and localised delivery. 
 ― The Scottish Government has set ‘flourishing’ as an objective for those in 
receipt of formal care but has not engaged with the academic literature of 
what ‘flourishing’ actually means or how it can be measured and assessed. 
 ― Professional social work has, historically, been slow to adapt to new 
theories of care and is often stuck in the ‘managerial’ model, insufficiently 
focussed on relationships. This depersonalises care – we care because 
the rules say we must, not because professionals have a relationship with 
a person who needs care. 
 ― This is in part because there is too much focus on ‘protection’ rather 
than care. Caring would take into account the concerns and needs of 
the individual while protection assumes bad intentions on the part of the 
individual and often fails to go beyond that. ‘Caring about’ outcomes is 
abstract; we need to ‘care for’ and ‘care with’  the specific person. 
 ― The predominant orientation in care has  become one of ‘safety’. This is 
even more true of organisations and institutions than individuals. Fear of 
reputational risk is often a greater driver of policy and practice than the 
need to care is. 
 ― This leads to risk-aversion in the workforce which, along with poor terms 
and conditions leading to high turnover and lack of proper training, creates a 
workforce incapable of delivering the right kind of long-term, relational care. 
 ― There is no evidence that this regulatory approach has improved 
services but it has clearly disempowered professionals and carers. It is 
incentivising risk aversion much more than it is incentivising effective care 
approaches. This is not to argue there should be no accountability, but 
that it should be designed in a way that enhances the experience of care 
for people who need it and not the managers who manage it.
 ― The integration of care into health has dragged care further from its 
purpose; health and care are practices based on different orientations 
towards knowledgeand the current dominance of health over care is 
harming the practices of care. Sometimes just ‘being with’ rather than 
‘doing to’ is key to social care, but this can be less the case for health care. 
 ― Current care policy (like health policy) takes insufficient account of 
inequality and the ability of different groups to access services based on 
personal  circumstances and conditions. Its one-size-fits-all approach is 
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INTRODUCTION
Social care is, more than ever, a wicked social 
issue subject to intense political scrutiny. The 
Covid-19 pandemic has brought pre-existing 
problems into sharp relief. The pandemic has 
impacted social care priorities and practices 
around, for instance, care home visits with 
implications for staff and user experiences of 
care. The terrain on which social care operates 
is likely to continue to change in the post-Covid 
environment, shifting the balance between the 
provision of medical services and social care 
support. This could go either way; it could 
validate the contribution and make the case for 
improved resourcing of social care or it could 
lead to limited resources being focussed on 
acute medical services.
Current day thinking on social care is framed by 
the neoliberal political and economic ideologies 
that emerged over the course of the 1980s and 
1990s. Based around principles of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness, these commodified 
care and took it into the marketplace (Scourfield 
2011). At another level, neoliberal ideology, 
emphasising as it does qualities of autonomy, 
competition and independence, failed to 
adequately recognise the relational dimensions 
of care within which dependency is often central 
(Steckley and Smith, 2011).
The pandemic prompted the Scottish Government 
to set up an Independent Review of Adult Social 
Care chaired by Derek Feeley, a former Scottish 
Government Director General for Health and 
Social Care and Chief Executive of NHS Scotland. 
Feeley states the need to ‘shift the paradigm’ and 
establish a new narrative on social care.
The recommendations of the Feeley Review were 
taken even further by the Scottish Government 
in their response to it. They proposed a National 
Care Service with the aim that “the country’s 
social care system will consistently deliver 
high quality services to everyone that needs 
them, based around principles of human rights” 
(Scottish Government, 2021). The Scottish 
Government proposals set out a range of 
social groups recognised to be in need of care 
including those with physical disabilities, learning 
disabilities or mental health conditions, older 
people and those with dementia, people with 
or recovering from alcohol or drug addictions, 
those who are, have been or are at risk of being 
homeless, and children and families who may 
need additional support, or where children 
are unable to live with their own families. This 
makes much sense and holds out the possibility 
of a cradle to grave care service, within which 
common principles permeate practice at every 
level and with every client group. There are 
parallels here with the kind of vision for social 
work that emerged following the 1968 Social 
Work (Scotland) Act before the profession 
became fragmented into different specialisms 
(although, as is discussed later, social work never 
really came to terms with the idea of care).
Having recognised this broad range of care needs, 
the proposals themselves do little to shift the 
paradigm within which care is thought of or to 
move the debate beyond a neoliberal paradigm, 
based as they are around private sector financing 
models and new public management mantras of 
improvement. They also seek to centralise care 
provision with the Scottish Government, further 
eroding the role of local authorities in responding 
to community needs, and as such contrary to the 
principles of the Christie Committee (2011) , which 
called for services to be delivered as near as 
possible to communities.
But the major gap in the Review and subsequent 
Government proposals is that, in focusing 
on service delivery, they fail to engage with 
any idea of what it is that is to be delivered 
– what might this notion of care that is being 
promised look or feel like? Nor does the Review 
or Government proposals address related 
knowledge and identity issues among the 
workforce. The result of these failures to move 
beyond current inadequate understandings is 
that social care will continue to be conceived of 
as a largely instrumental task (often delivered 
in 15-30-minute blocks) and with a primary 
mandate around protection and safety. This 
hinders any development of the relational and, 
generally, the more life-enhancing aspects that 
ought to be central to care. 
Supporting any wider conception of care 
demands a shift beyond managerial concerns 
to consider a philosophical rationale for care. 
There is a well-developed body of philosophical 
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literature on care, which is not recognisable 
in Feeley’s or in the Scottish Government’s 
proposals. In particular, the focus on rights, 
which is at the heart of and which seeks to 
furnish the proposals with some theoretical 
ballast, offers an inadequate paradigm within 
which to locate care, a point this paper returns 
to. The failure to engage with some of these 
deeper philosophical debates is likely to limit the 
range of possibilities that a National Care Service 
might offer. The intention of this paper is to 
outline some philosophical perspectives on care, 
with a Scottish flavour.
CARE AS INSTRUMENTAL OR 
RELATIONAL
A key tension in any debate around care is 
around the balance between its rational and 
relational dimensions. Some of these tensions 
might be traced back to The Enlightenment, 
that period of major scientific and philosophical 
advance that swept Europe over the 18th Century. 
A key feature of the European Enlightenment was 
a turn to science and reason as ways through 
which to understand the human condition. The 
Prussian philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1998), 
became perhaps the key thinker in this regard. 
Kant proclaimed human beings to be rational, 
autonomous individuals who used reason 
to determine how they ought to behave. His 
deontological ethics stressed the quality of duty. 
His categorical imperative decreed that what 
was considered right in one situation should 
apply universally. From a Kantian perspective 
care might be thought of as a public duty (rather, 
arguably than a public good), which ought to be 
delivered equitably. While there is some merit in 
such a proposition it is also inadequate as it fails 
to appreciate a version of care that goes beyond 
duty to incorporate a purpose or end point to 
care or to recognise the particularist aspects of 
care relationships, which mean that they can’t be 
the same for everyone.
Kantian principles have been incredibly influential 
since the Enlightenment and are a bedrock of 
dominant ideas of professionalism. The pursuit of 
objectivity, for instance, has seen care workers, 
under the guise of professionalism, seek to  
separate their rational/intellectual selves from 
their intuitive/emotional ones, splitting off the 
professional from the personal. Qualities of 
objectivity and detachment are encouraged, while 
emotional involvement with clients is seen as 
unprofessional. Such assumptions are problematic 
when it comes to care, where the personal and 
professional inevitably and rightly elide.
Interestingly, Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers in particular, Hutcheson, Hume 
and Smith, raised questions about this wider 
turn to rationality - all identified an emotional 
or sentimental side to human nature named, 
variously as benevolence, sympathy or fellow 
feeling (see Hearn 2016). Hume went so far 
as to claim that reason was but a slave to the 
passions – that an emotional response when 
encountering another human being or when 
coming to decisions was primary. This quality of 
moral sentiment drew individuals to reach out 
to one another based, not on reason or self-
interest, but on something more intrinsically 
human. This moral impulse was reprised in 20th 
Century philosophy. Levinas’ (1979) ethics of 
encounter imagines humans as being drawn to 
‘the face’, the unknowable essence of the other. 
For Levinas, ethics and specifically, the obligation 
and responsibility we hold for ‘the other’ 
precedes reason. The Scottish philosopher, John 
Macmurray, picked up on the tension between 
reason and emotion, arguing that excessive 
rationality acts to marginalise the role of 
emotions in the human condition. In a challenge 
to Kantian ethics, Macmurray (1961) conceives 
of human beings not as autonomous, rational 
individuals but as ‘persons in relation’, existing 
only by virtue of their relationships with one 
another. In a challenge to deontological ethics, 
Macmurray argues that care is not possible in 
terms of duty and obligation but must emerge as 
an ethic of love (see McIntosh, 2004).
Another feature of a Scottish approach to care can 
be discerned in the work of the Scottish human 
relations theorists, Fairbairn, Suttie and Sutherland 
(see Kirkwood, 2012;  Miller, 2007) These writers 
brought together growing interest in psychiatry in 
the context of their own Presbyterianism.  While 
Presbyterianism might be thought to have cast 
a questionable shadow over Scottish cultural 
life it also called its adherents to an idea of a 
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godly commonwealth and an obligation to act 
towards the common good – it was not merely 
individualistic but brought with it obligations to 
one’s neighbours (see Sharpe, 2016).
CARE ETHICS
Joan Tronto (1994), a seminal writer on care 
ethics argues that Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers came out on the losing side in eighteenth 
century intellectual debates, when Kantian ideas 
became and have, largely, remained dominant. 
Nevertheless, the centrality of moral sentiment 
in its relationship to reason is re-emerging as a 
key theme in ethical thinking, as is evident in the 
heightened attention given to care ethics across 
a range of academic and professional disciplines.
Care (or feminist) ethics were first elaborated by 
Carol Gilligan (1982), who identified differential 
responses to moral dilemmas between men and 
women, the male voice being based around 
rules and reason and the female one drawing 
more on qualities of intuition and compassion. 
The male and female voices were seen as 
reflecting different moral orientations rather 
than being essentialised with men or women. 
Tronto, in her book Moral Boundaries (1994: 126) 
described care as “a practice, rather than a set 
of rules or principles”. It is both an activity and a 
disposition, which in a social care context, might 
be understood in terms of practice that is not 
merely task-focussed in the sense of following 
procedure or doing one’s duty, but is carried out 
in a manner that conveys a sense of care and of 
‘mattering’ to the one cared for.
Care ethics eschew Kantian universalism, being 
bound to particular, concrete situations; what 
is the right or wrong thing to do in a situation 
depends on context (this observation might make 
a case for a greater localism than is conceived 
of in the Scottish Government’s proposals). Care 
ethics also reject a purely rational approach, 
recognising the centrality of emotions in 
ethical deliberation and action. In that sense, 
Tronto (1994) identifies an explicit link from 
her conception of care ethics back to some of 
the central themes of Scottish Enlightenment 
thinking. She is careful, though, to recognise 
that good intentions are not enough and that 
caring also involves competence – being a 
caring person in itself does not necessarily lead 
to skilled caring practices around e.g. manual 
handling. On the other hand, skilled manual 
handling in the absence of a caring disposition is 
unlikely to be experienced as caring.
Other writers in the care ethics canon develop 
ideas of what care might be. Noddings (2002) 
identifies it as central to a notion of human 
flourishing, while Held (2006) argues that care 
presents us with a moral responsibility to provide 
for and respond to others. Care ethics appreciates 
the emotional and relational capabilities that 
enable the caregiver to understand what might 
be best to do at any one time, demonstrating a 
practical wisdom rather than merely following 
the rules. Moreover, care is not a unidirectional 
transaction, but reflects the engagement between 
inter-dependent and relational beings (Tronto and 
Fisher, 1990); it emerges out of the nature of the 
relationships that develop between the care giver 
and care receiver over time. This makes it difficult 
to standardise care as a managerial logic seeks to 
do; each care relationship will follow its own course.
Feder-Kittay (2003) recognises care as normative 
– it is a universal experience that happens in 
everyday contexts. As such, it is not confined to 
mandated or statutory care but is experienced in 
familial and neighbourly interactions and in informal 
settings such as pubs, cafes and hairdressers. 
And while the state cannot be expected to provide 
such sites or interactions, these, nonetheless, 
provide an important dimension to any more holistic 
understanding of care; it is not just something 
that is delivered by the state but happens all 
around us in everyday settings. The state needs 
to move away from the notion of care as statutory 
intervention and to work with the grain of such a 
wider ecology of care.
A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO 
CARE
Care literature often distinguishes between 
an affective ‘caring for’ (consisting in direct, 
ongoing relationships with particular others) and 
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a more abstract ‘caring about’ our fellow citizens 
(Noddings, 1984). Both are required; caring about 
provides the political and societal context which 
allows the face-to-face work of ‘caring for’ to 
happen. However, Noddings (1984) goes on to 
suggest that caring about can involve a certain 
benign neglect and is empty if it does not result 
in caring relations. So, it is all very well to speak 
about care but there is also an imperative to get 
one’s hands dirty at times in ‘doing’ care.
Tronto (2013) introduces a third dimension, 
that of ‘caring with’, which involves a wider 
orientation of solidarity fundamental for 
democracy. Indeed, Tronto’s work has provided a 
platform for the development of a wider political 
ethic of care (see also Held, 2006), which 
recognises that care is not merely interpersonal 
but is facilitated or impeded by political 
decisions around, for instance, the provision 
of free child or personal care but also in the 
way that society values carers, both formal and 
informal, through the rights, protections and 
conditions of service offered them. 
As I argue above, care needs to be recognised 
as a social good (Nussbaum, 2011). This is 
compromised by continuing to locate it within an 
economic system the primary motive of which 
is profit maximisation. Held (2006) argues that 
the ethics of care may be better equipped than 
traditional theories for guiding ethical thinking 
in global contexts, including addressing the 
limitation of market economies. Care ethics in 
this sense offer a counterpoint to the managerial 
direction of current and proposed care provision 
(Maegher and Parton, 2004).
A Nordic model of care
The Scottish Government has intermittently 
claimed to aspire to a Nordic model of care 
and this does set out a more comprehensive 
care paradigm than that set out by Feeley. 
A Nordic tradition of care, which emerged 
from the 1990s onwards (Arman et al, 2015) 
incorporates the nature of care, the ethics of 
care and a knowledge base for care. Caring 
is seen as a natural phenomenon in which a 
care receiver’s world, vulnerability, health, and 
suffering are primary. Caring is seen as both an 
art and an act (Arman et al, 2015). The literature 
also emphasises local solutions rather than 
general ethical principles (Mol et al. 2010), which 
might open up possibilities of care being delivered 
very differently – through local care co-operatives 
or hubs (see the report by Colin Turbett of the 
Common Weal Care Reform Group published as 
part of the work of the group towards developing 
a holistic care model for Scotland).
Care as flourishing
The Scottish Government (2021) claims to 
want to change the care system ‘from one that 
supports people to survive to one that empowers 
them to thrive’. There is literature that might 
expand what is meant by this. Influential writers 
(Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011) develop what has 
become known as the capabilities approach to 
care. This focuses on human flourishing and 
emphasises the skills and resources required to 
flourish, not just survive (which is taken up in the 
Scottish Government’s aspiration). If care should 
aspire to more than survival or the maintenance 
of a ‘good enough’ degree of functioning one of 
the prerequisites of this will be to enable care-
receivers – and caregivers – to flourish as the 
individuals they are, within the relationships that 
are most important to them.   
SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL 
CARE
At a professional level, difficulties around 
care are amplified in the current political 
and economic climate. An extended period 
of austerity has left services depleted, local 
authorities struggling to meet their statutory 
obligations and a workforce under strain. But 
there is also a broader conceptual tension that 
emerges out of the uneasy relationship between 
social work and social care. As a profession, 
social work has always enjoyed a superordinate 
role within that relationship. This is problematic 
because social work has rarely engaged with 
the idea of care, basing much of its professional 
identity around promoting ideas of independence 
and empowerment. Care on the other hand 
recognises dependency and inter-dependency.
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While care has rarely been central to social work 
there is, nevertheless, a growing body of writing 
that seeks to apply care ethics to social work 
contexts (Orme, 2002). Lloyd (2006) makes the 
case that ethics of care present a challenge to 
social workers with older people to re-assess 
the place of care within professional social work 
practice and to reappraise how concepts of 
justice, autonomy and rights are conceptualized 
and ageing is understood.
State care, however, for the most part struggles 
to move beyond its Kantian roots and in its quest 
to be seen as ‘professional’ rather than just 
‘everyday’, it has devalued the moral, emotional 
and practical dimensions of care. Bubeck (1995: 
231) claims that public care is ‘shaped by the 
requirement of impartiality’, and as such carers 
are expected not to allow relationships to 
influence their actions. A consequence is that 
there has been a privileging of tasks, based 
upon abstract managerial eligibility principles, 
over practical and relational encounters between 
carers and those cared for. This undermines the 
trust and indeed the affection upon which these 
relationships must be based (Held 2006).
Partly as a result of this predominant focus on 
task, state care and services commissioned 
by the state are often low on ambition. 
Contemporary public care services mandated 
to care often fail to ‘care for’ or ‘with’ people 
in any affective or moral sense: they may be 
impersonal, or inattentive, providing physical 
care but not caring care (Maier, 1979). There is 
an important philosophical point here. As Bauman 
(2000) argues, the more we surround everyday 
practices of care with evermore rules and 
regulations, the more we dissipate the primary 
moral impulse to care, the more we efface 
the face that Levinas asserts we are called to 
respond to. We act from a reductionist sense of 
duty – we care because the rules say we have to 
rather than through any deeper draw to do so.
Furthermore, social work professional identity 
has, in recent decades, formed around a primary 
concern for protection, beginning with child 
protection and more recently extended to adult 
protection. Again, care ethics provide an insight 
into the conceptual difficulties with this focus. 
Protection ‘involves a very different conception 
of the relationship between an individual or 
group, and others than does care. Caring seems 
to involve taking the concerns and needs of 
the other as the basis for action. Protection 
presumes the bad intentions and harm that 
the other is likely to bring to bear against the 
self or group and to require a response to that 
potential harm. Protection can also become 
self-serving, turning into what Judith Hicks Stein 
calls a ‘protection racket’ in which the need 
for protection reinforces itself (Tronto 1994: 
104-05). Social work has morphed, in recent 
decades, into a ‘protection racket’ within which 
laudable intentions to protect individuals have, 
in many cases, become the limit of the social 
work role, precluding any wider aspiration to 
promote flourishing.
STATE CARE AND THE CARE 
WORKFORCE
A social care system that cared for or with its 
recipients would be characterised by stability 
and a sense of intrinsic and reciprocal reward 
from meeting emotional and practical needs, 
rather than the rapid staff turnover, excessive 
workloads (Crenna-Jennings, 2018) and risk 
aversion that characterise present-day care. In 
risk-averse climates, services are driven, largely, 
by procedural and task-oriented approaches, 
reflecting instrumental rather than relational 
care (Cottam, 2018).
The institutional logic of state social services 
has become one of safety, not just for recipients 
of services but arguably more so in respect of 
organisations avoiding reputational damage. Any 
progressive politics of social work ‘is threatened 
as social workers confront the widening gulf 
between professional ideals and the realities of 
their practice within the morally conservative 
context of neoliberal risk society’ (Stanford, 
2011: 1514).  Stanford goes on to recognise 
social workers’ own sense of being ‘at risk’ (of 
disciplinary or regulatory action) within this wider 
cultural and organisational context. This sense of 
risk is reinforced by the regulatory apparatus that 
has emerged over the past two decades.
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Regulation
Feeley and the Scottish Government conceive of 
an enhanced regulatory function to govern the 
new National Care Service. Since The Regulation 
of Care Act (2001), care services have been 
regulated by the Care Commission (now the Care 
Inspectorate) and the workforce by the Scottish 
Social Services Council. Whilst a key justification 
for regulation was to enhance professional 
identity, there is little evidence that it has done so. 
Indeed, a growing literature points to conflictual 
and unproductive relationships between the 
social work and social care professions and 
their regulators, within which a marked power 
imbalance in favour of the regulator is apparent 
(Simpson et al 2020). More generally, there is no 
evidence that regulation has improved services. 
In that sense, regulatory systems might be seen 
as propagating themselves to little benefit for the 
care recipient or giver.
Central to this power imbalance between care 
workers and the regulators is the fitness to 
practise processes, which entail that workers 
are judged and potentially struck from the 
registration list if found wanting, often by panels 
of people  who know nothing of their practice 
and where “no body of knowledge, no evidence, 
no discrete idea or philosophy underpins the 
‘system’ of regulation” (Haney, 2012). Those 
undertaking direct care tasks are far more likely 
to fall foul of such systems than those involved in 
more administrative tasks (Banks et al, 2020). It is 
not a state that is conducive to offering relational 
care, which involves risks of such care being 
misconstrued or identified as unprofessional. 
In fact, it provides an incentive to merely follow 
the rules and do the minimum that is required to 
avoid falling foul of the regulator.
Regulation, by its nature, locates good practice 
in external rules and threats of disciplinary 
action rather than within the internal sense 
of responsibleness (Green, 2009). It is this 
more intrinsic motivation to care and to care 
well that drives practitioners to achieve what 
MacIntyre (1984) identifies as internal goods 
or standards of excellence. In focussing on 
codified requirements, regulation privileges a 
narrow conception of ostensibly measurable 
effectiveness over any wider sense of 
excellence, which requires that practitioners 
think beyond codes and are guided by the needs 
of the concrete others that they care for.
To critique current systems of regulation is not 
to argue that carers should not be accountable 
for the care they offer – but there are other more 
local and developmental ways that this could 
happen. It is to question whether recourse to a 
regulatory model that is increasingly recognised 
as inadequate and, arguably, counter-productive 
to improving practice or enhancing the 
professional identity of care workers should form 
a central plank of current proposals.
The knowledge base of care
There is another dimension implicated in the 
difficulty that social care workers can have in 
asserting a professional identity, which is to do 
with the knowledge base for social care. The 
failure to explore this and how it might differ from 
the types of knowledge required for other forms 
of work explains a lot in terms of the difficulties 
in valuing the sector but also casts some light 
on the pitfalls of attempting structural initiatives 
such as the integration of health and social 
care. That the health and social care integration 
agenda has been beset by difficulties is not 
merely or primarily down to poor management 
or leadership as can be posited, but more 
fundamentally reflects tensions around the 
different forms of knowledge that underpin 
the different fields of practice. While there is 
inevitable crossover, the different knowledge 
practices of health and social care reflect 
different academic roots: medical sciences and 
related science disciplines on the one hand and 
sociology, anthropology and philosophy on the 
other (Lloyd Richards 2020). Ignoring, or more 
likely being unaware of these will make the task 
of encouraging effective working between health 
and social care organizationally and on the 
ground all the more difficult.
Professional education in medical fields valorises 
cognitive and instrumental forms of knowledge, 
seeking to apply a ‘scientific’ knowledge of what 
is going on in a situation and follow this through 
with a clinical or medical intervention. The social 
care task does not lend itself to such a way of 
working. Garfat (1999) describes a central task 
of residential child care workers as ‘hanging out’ 
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with children. The idea applies across all client 
groups. ‘Hanging out’ involves just ‘being with’ 
someone rather than ‘doing to’ them; it might 
involve watching television or doing a crossword 
with them, listening to their stories, sharing a cup 
of tea (and knowing how many sugars someone 
might take). It may involve doing very little that is 
seen or spoken. Tronto (1994: 16) says that care 
requires that we recognise “unspoken needs, 
distinguishing among and deciding which needs 
to care about”. In this sense, care involves intuition 
and discernment. In practice this may require that 
workers have sufficient autonomy to decide how 
to best divide and spend their time with people, 
giving those who need more attention more time 
when this is required and others less, rather than 
this being circumscribed by set time blocks.
Because one can’t necessarily say how long it 
will take to complete a crossword or to measure 
the benefits of sitting watching television 
with someone, ‘hanging out’ is anathema to a 
managerial logic which seeks to parcel care 
into set tasks. ‘Hanging out’ is also problematic 
because it doesn’t reflect the kind of ‘scientific’ 
knowledge that is seen by policy-makers to 
be more robust than social care knowledge 
with implications for the respective identities 
of workers in the different sectors; health 
professions are better regarded (and paid) 
than carers. Yet, overly scientific forms of 
knowledge are argued to be inadequate in 
‘people professions’ (Bondi et al, 2011). Whan 
(1986: 244) argues that there is a need ‘to define 
the daily encounter with clients not as a matter 
of technique or method but as practical-moral 
involvement’. Social care concerns the art and 
craft of everyday life (Lloyd Richards, 2020). It 
requires a practical rationality, within which the 
person and the disposition of the carer are central 
(Smith, 2020). This involves a different way of 
knowing which includes practical, embodied and 
reflexive knowledge (Kinsella 2001).
CARE AND HEALTH 
INEQUALITIES
A further point in any political conversation 
about care is the connection between care and 
inequalities, a connection not sufficiently picked 
up in the proposals for a National Care Service. 
There is a clear link between social conditions 
and health outcomes, the magnitude of health 
inequalities being an indicator of the impact of 
social and economic inequalities on peoples’ 
lives. These inequalities can be reinforced in 
the current situation in which those who are 
articulate or have articulate advocates are likely 
to be able to lay greater claim to care than those 
without such resources. This is particularly 
salient at the moment given concerns about 
drugs deaths but more generally, it is evident 
in the ‘deaths of despair’ that are only most 
pronounced in what has become known as 
‘the Glasgow Effect’ but are apparent across 
Scotland. Care, then, needs to be understood 
in the context of inequalities of generation, 
knowledge, social status and esteem. But it also 
involves relational inequalities. In this regard, 
Lynch et al’s (2016) work on ‘affective inequality’ 
is important as it links care relationships to social 
justice. Our life chances are highly influenced 
by the kind of care relationships we are able to 
call upon, partly because of the positive impact 
that affirming relationships have on esteem and 
functioning and partly as a result of the social 
capital that can accrue from such relationships. 
The distribution of care (Calder 2018) therefore 
requires interrogation.
CARE AND RIGHTS
Feeley and the Scottish Government propose a 
care service based around rights. From a care 
ethics perspective, rights speak to a theory of 
justice rather than of care. The rights discourse, 
as it has developed in the anglophone world, 
is consistent with a wider neoliberal worldview 
(Harvey 2007). It reflects an “increasing recourse 
to law as a means of mediating relationships ... 
premised on particular values and a particular 
understanding of the subject as a rational, 
autonomous individual” (Dahlberg & Moss 2005: 
30), capable of entering into relationships that 
are broadly contractual.
Yet care should not be considered as contractual. 
It has its origins in early, unchosen and 
dependant parental relationships that cannot be 
13
Common Weal What is care?
contractual. Care, as Noddings (2002) argues 
“starts at home”; early experience of care 
becomes the template for future caring, (which, 
again, might make the case for any National Care 
Service to apply across all client groups). Care of 
children must occur before the question of justice 
arises and must be assumed before questions of 
contractual rights become relevant. In this sense, 
care is more basic than justice – rights depend 
upon care and can only be mediated through 
relationships (Lloyd-Richards, 2020). Moreover, 
people are only motivated to recognise and 
respect the rights of others if they care for them 
in at least a minimal sense. Care ethics, in this 
sense, shift the way we think about care away 
from rules and rights towards relationships and 
responsibilities (Held, 2006).
But there is another, fundamental, problem with 
rights; they create a set of obligations and duties 
on those conferring the right (in this case the 
Scottish Government or any new body set up to 
manage the National Care Service). This implies 
that such institutional structures have the power 
and resources to enact or offer such a right. 
This takes no account of the wider economic 
context, which is one of austerity and strictly 
limited resources. The practical manifestation 
of this is that social workers may assess a need, 
which may then be framed as a right, but there 
will be no way to claim or certainly to avail of 
such a right. The only way to deal with this is 
to set rights at a minimalist level that may allow 
people to survive but cannot but fail to achieve 
any aspiration towards care that enables people 
to thrive. A rights-based approach will only raise 
expectations that cannot be met.
There are other banalities within a rights-
based approach. What purpose is served by 
telling a dementing older person or someone 
with a severe learning disability that they have 
particular rights but no capacity to understand 
or claim such rights? Any such rights they may 
have can only be mediated through caring 
relationships, whether family or through skilled 
social care practice. This mediation takes the 
form of relatedness between the person with 
the obligation (or their proxy) and the person 
requiring care. This relationship is not simply 
a transactional one but realises and embodies 
a relational and social good in its performance 
(Lloyd-Richards, 2020). 
CONCLUSIONS
As the prospect of a National Care Service 
becomes imminent, it becomes all the more 
important that any such service is built on 
solid foundations. Early signs of this are not 
encouraging and merely reiterate calls for more 
effective structures or for a service based 
around human rights. Both approaches are 
fundamentally flawed and destined to fail. Any 
worthwhile National Care Service needs to start 
from a philosophical exploration of what care, 
across the lifecourse,is or might be. A starting 
point for this would be the need to move beyond 
rules and rights and to build a system based on 
a recognition of mutual responsibilities and the 
realisation of these through human relationships.
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